Introduction to stack smashing

CODE: http://bit.ly/OWASPGetInput





About Me



- Computer science graduate
- Web developer with an interest in security
- Wannabe hacker 😳

Contact

- www.meetup.com/Melbourne-Security-Hub/
- www.au.linkedin.com/in/julianberton
- gplus.to/julianberton
- @JulianBerton (Twitter not very active)



About Daniel



- Software engineering student
- Web development startup co-founder
- Swinburne Cyber Security Club committee member, speaker and web admin.

Contact

- Blog: <u>http://danielparker.me/</u>
- Email: <u>dparker.tech@gmail.com</u>
- Google+: <u>http://gplus.to/DanielParker</u>



About OWASP



Honorary mention...

What they say(owasp.org):

- Not-for-profit charitable organization focused on improving the security of software
- Make software security visible

The main flagship projects:

- OWASP top 10
- OWASP Testing Guide
- OWASP Development Guide

Link to documents: http://bit.ly/OWASPflagship



About you



Now you know about us , its only fair we know a bit about you :)

Assumed Knowledge



And, it would really, really, really help if you have:

- Basic understanding/knowledge of programming in C or C++
- Number systems, base 2, 10, 16
- Debugging... GDB, etc.
- An idea of the x86/x64 assembly language
- Bit of BASH

After Tonight



What's in it for you?!

- Finding a vulnerability in a C program
- Exploiting the vulnerability (live demo)
- Exploit your own buffer(challenge)!!


But first, the boring stuff

- The hexadecimal number system (hex)
- x86 registers (SP, IP, BP)
- The stack data type and how it's used in assembly

Buffer Overflow??



- What is a buffer in programmer speak?
- Buffer overflow vs buffer overrun?
- Are they the same as a stack overflow?
- No! They are all different!!



http://stackoverflow.com/questions/5296758/stack-vs-buffer

Buffer Overflow??



Who can spot the problem??? Is there a vulnerability in this C++ code?

- 1 #include
- 2 **#includ**e
- 3 using namespace std;
- 4 const int INPUT_SIZE=10;

```
10 int main()
11 {
12     char vals[INPUT_SIZE];
13     char sub[INPUT_SIZE];
14     string s1 = getString();
15
16     copyVals(s1,vals);
17     getSubstring(vals,sub);
18     cout << "sub string: " << sub << endl;
19
20     return 0;
21 }
</pre>
```

```
string getString()
23
24
       cout << "Please type a string: ";</pre>
25
       string s;
27
       getline(cin,s);
       return s;
28
29
     }
     void copyVals(string s, char vals[])
31
32
33
       for (size_t i = 0; i < s.length(); i++)</pre>
         vals[i] = s.at(i);
       vals[i] ='\0';
35
36
```

Why Do We Care?



- Why bother exploiting a program which we'll probably never encounter?
- It's a great starting point for code exploitation
- Because it's fun!
- Covers knowledge you will need for more advanced topics
- Buffer overflows are becoming harder to achieve due to:
 - Modern languages automatically checking array bounds
 - and Modern defences(ASLR, DEP, Stack protection, etc)

Why Do We Care?



Secur	rity Focus ™				
info	discussion	exploit	solution	references	
		10 0471		a	1.125

Oracle Java SE CVE-2013-2471 Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

Bugtraq ID:	60659
Class:	Unknown
CVE:	CVE-2013-2471
Remote:	Yes
Local:	No
Published:	Jun 18 2013 12:00AM
Updated:	Oct 09 2013 12:57AM
Credit:	Vitaliy Toropov
Vulnerable:	Ubuntu Ubuntu Linux 10.04 LTS SuSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP4 SuSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP3 LTSS SuSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Java 10 SP4 SuSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 11 SP2 SuSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 10 SP4 SuSE openSUSE 11.4

- Java checks bounds automatically....
- So how can it have a buffer overflow?
- And it is very recent!!!!


Why Do We Care?



Looking deeper.....

				Remote CVSS VERSION 2.0 RISK (see Risk Matrix Definitions)					Supported				
CVE#	Component	Protocol	Sub- component	Exploit without Auth.?		Access Vector	Access Complexity		Confiden- tiality	Integrity	Avail- ability		Notes
CVE-2013-2470	Java Runtime Environment	Multiple	2D	Yes	10.0	Network	Low	None	Complete	Complete	Complete		See Note 1
CVE-2013-2471	Java Runtime Environment	Multiple	2D	Yes	10.0	Network	Low	None	Complete	Complete	Complete	7 Update 21 and before, 6 Update 45 and before, 5.0 Update 45 and before	See Note 1
CVE-2013-2472	Java	Multiple	2D	Yes	10.0	Network	Low	None	Complete	Complete	Complete	7 Update 21 and	See

Its actually a flaw in the JVM. Which are mostly written in C or C++!




http://redmonk.com/sogrady/2012/09/12/language-rankings-9-12/

Bits, Bytes and Nibbles?



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Important to Know how many Bits in a Byte, etc.

http://blog2.d3view.com/a-few-words-on-memory-settings-in-lsdyna/


Number Systems



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Binary	Decimal	Hexadecimal
0000	0	0
0001	1	1
0010	2	2
0011	3	3
0100	4	4
0101	5	5
0110	6	6
0111	7	7
1000	8	8
1001	9	9
1010	10	A
1011	11	В
1100	12	С
1101	13	D
1110	14	Ê
1111	15	F



http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/A-

<u>level_Computing/AQA/Problem_Solving, Programming,</u> <u>Data_Representation_and_Practical_Exercise/Fundamental</u> <u>s_of_Data_Representation/Binary_number_system</u>

http://image.tutorvista.com/cms/images/38/hexadecimal-numberchart.jpg

C Data Types



NameDescriptionSize*charCharacter or small integer1 byteshort int
(short)Short integer2 bytesintInteger4 bytes

ASCII Hex Symbol

96	60	•
97	61	а
98	62	b
99	63	С
100	64	d
101	65	е
102	66	f
103	67	g
104	68	h
105	69	i
106	6A	j
107	6B	k
108	6C	1
109	6D	m
110	6E	n
111	6F	0

ʻa'(char)

= 0x61 (hex)

= 0110 0001 (binary)

= 1 byte

Typical but not always the case. Compiler dependent. Doing a sizeof() will clarify. Or by looking at the assembly code :)

This is very important

Assembly (x86)



Do we have to be an assembly expert?
 No

...but you should understand common instructions, registers and how the stack and heap works.


• By one measure, only 14 assembly instructions account for 90% of code!

http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-06/BH-US-06-Bilar.pdf

Assembly (x86)



C code



Compiled assembly for GetInput()

<+0>:	push	%гbр
<+1>:	mov	%rsp,%rbp
<+4>:	sub	\$0x10,%rsp
<+8>:	lea	-0x10(%rbp),%rax
<+12>:	mov	%rax,%rdi
<+15>:	callq	0x400480 <gets@plt></gets@plt>
<+20>:	lea	-0x10(%rbp),%rax
<+24>:	mov	%rax,%rdi
<+27>:	callq	0x400460 <puts@plt></puts@plt>
<+32>:	leaveq	
<+33>:	retq	

Registers (x86)



- Registers are small memory storage areas built into the processor (volatile, like memory)
- 8 "general purpose" registers + the instruction pointer which points at the next instruction to execute
- But two of the 8 are not that general (SP and BP)
- On x86-32, registers are 32 bits long
- On x86-64, they're 64 bits

Registers (x86)




			← 16 8 bits	bits
(EAX	AX	AH	AL
sters	EBX	вх	BH	BL
se Regi	ECX	сх	СН	CL
General-purpose Registers	EDX	DX	DH	DL
eneral	ESI			
0	EDI			
(stack	ESP pointer)			
	EBP pointer)			
(2000	F	↓ 32	bits —	
	EIP uction pinter)			

- **ESP** Stack pointer
- **EBP** Stack frame base pointer
- **EIP** Pointer to next instruction to

execute ("instruction pointer")

Memory





- Stack grows from high to low memory addresses
- Program instructions are stored at low addresses
- Every program gets its own stack and heap

// stack or heap?


char buff[500];

char *buff = (char *)malloc(500);



- The stack is a conceptual area of main memory (RAM) which is designated by the OS when a program is started.
- A stack is a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO/FILO) data structure where data is "pushed" on to the top of the stack and "popped" off the top.
- By convention the stack grows toward lower memory addresses. Adding something to the stack means the top of the stack is now at a lower memory address.








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PUSH

































































Endian



- Each memory address can store a single byte, not 4 bytes.
- We've defined a word to mean 32 bits. This is the same as 4 bytes.
- Each register is 32 bits in an x86 CPU


Example

Suppose we have a 32 bit quantity, written as FEEDFAEC in hex


So, the 4 bytes are: FE, ED, FA, EC where each byte requires 2 hex digits.

There are two ways to store this in memory.....

Endianess



Stack Frame



In The Real World



- Is it likely that you will have the source code or even the binary that is running on a server you are trying to exploit?
- Yes! Most people use standard software. Apache (web server), Sendmail (mail server) etc.
- Otherwise you could use social engineering to get your hands on it :)

Ok, So What If I Don't Have The Code????



- Use a disassembler(e.g. IDA)!!!
- But i thought you need debug flags turned on to get readable code????
- Lets compare the code in different scenarios.....

Ok, So What If I Don't Have The Code????



Generated from IDA Pro with a binary that has no debug flags

90	// (08048434)
91	<pre>voidcdecl CanNeverExecute()</pre>
92	{
93	<pre>puts("I can never execute");</pre>
94	exit(0);
95	}
96	
97	// (08048452)
98	<pre>intcdecl GetInput()</pre>
99	{
100	char s; // [sp+18h] [bp-10h]@1
101	
102	<pre>gets(&s);</pre>
103	<pre>return puts(&s);</pre>
104	}
105	
106	// (08048470)
107	<pre>intcdecl main()</pre>
108	{
109	GetInput();
110	return 0;
111	}
112	

Exploitable Code



13

۱5

17

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void handle(int newsock) {
 int backdoor = 0;
 char buffer[1016];
 memset(buffer, 0, 1016);
 send(newsock, "Welcome to CSAW CTF.", 21, 0);
 recv(newsock, buffer, 1020, 0);
 buffer[1015] = 0;

 if (backdoor) {
 fd = fopen("./key", "r");
 fscanf(fd, "%s\n", buffer);
 send(newsock, buffer, 512, 0);
 }
 close(newsock);

<u>A Symphony in C</u> Starring deprecated code

• Can you guess what is deprecated?

- Another example from CSAW CTF 2013 of a potential buffer overflow
 - Use fgets instead: fgets (char * str, int num, FILE * stream)
 - We can limit the number of characters it brings in with "num"

Exploitable Code



```
void function(char *str) {
    char buffer[16];
    // strncpy ( char * destination, const char * source, size_t num );
    strcpy(buffer,str);
    strcpy(buffer,str);
    void main() {
        char large_string[256];
        int i;
        // fgets ( char * str, int num, FILE * stream );
        scanf("%s", large_string);
        function(large_string);
    }
```

- Another example!!
- So many exploits to choose from. Where should i begin!?

Demo x86_64



julian@ubuntu:~\$ gcc -ggdb -fno-stack-protector -o GetInput GetInput.c

Compiling with debug flags

Stack protection turned off

			Little Endian			8bytes = 8*8 = 64bits			
			/						
(gdb) x/8xg \$	esp		¥						
0xbffff360:	0x0000000008048490		0xb7e3	b4d30000	0000				
0xbffff370:	0xbffff40400000001		0xb7fdc858bffff40c						
0xbffff380:	0xbffff41c00000000		0x00000000bffff40c						
0xbffff390:	0xb7fc6ff40804823c		0x0000000000000000						
(gdb) x/32xb 1	\$esp								
0xbffff360:	0x90	0x84	0x04	0x08	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	
0xbffff368:	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0xd3	0xb4	0xe3	0xb7	
0xbffff370:	0x01	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x04	0xf4	0xff	0xbf	
0xbffff378:	0x0c	0xf4	0xff	0xbf	0x58	0xc8	0xfd	0xb7	

Demo



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	Dump of assembler code			
	0x08048452 <+0>:	push	%ebp	P
	0x08048453 <+1>:	mov	%esp,%ebp	P
	0x08048455 <+3>:	sub	\$0x28,%esp	
	=> 0x08048458 <+6>:	lea	-0x10(%ebp),%eax	(1
	0x0804845b <+9>:	mov	%eax,(%esp)	-
	0x0804845e <+12>:	call	0x8048330 <gets@plt></gets@plt>	
	0x08048463 <+17>:	lea	-0x10(%ebp),%eax	0
	0x08048466 <+20>:	mov	%eax,(%esp)	
	0x08048469 <+23>:	call	0x8048340 <puts@plt></puts@plt>	=
	0x0804846e <+28>:	leave		
	0x0804846f <+29>:	ret		=
	End of assembler dump.			
	(gdb) disas main			
	Dump of assembler code	for fun	ction main:	
	0x08048470 <+0>:	push	%ebp	
	0x08048471 <+1>:	mov	%esp,%ebp	
	0x08048473 <+3>:	and	\$0xfffffff0,%esp	
	0x08048476 <+6>:	call	0x8048452 <getinput></getinput>	
	── 0x0804847b <+11>:	mov	\$0x0,%eax	
Return address	0x08048480 <+16>:	leave		Doe
	0x08048481 <+17>:	ret		oft
	End of assembler dump.			
	4			(1 v

Pushing the base Pointer onto the stack (1 word)

0x28 = 40(decimal) = 40 bytes of space = 40/4 = 10 words

Does an implicit push of the return address (1 word) onto the stack.





How many words are added onto the stack from GetInput() to gets(buffer)?

Breakpoint 1, main () at GetInput.c:16						
16 <mark>G</mark> e	16 GetInput();					
(gdb) x/20xw \$	esp					
0xbffff360:	0x08048490	0x00000000	0x00000000	0xb7e3b4d3		
0xbffff370:	0x00000001	0xbffff404	0xbffff40c	0xb7fdc858		
0xbffff380:	0x00000000	0xbffff41c	0xbffff40c	0x00000000		
0xbffff390:	0x0804823c	0xb7fc6ff4	0x00000000	0x00000000		
0xbffff3a0:	0x00000000	0x15f8119e	0x2d77d58e	0x00000000		
(gdb) s						

		New top o	f stack	/ Base poi	nter of main
Breakpoint 2, G 12 get (gdb) x/20xw \$e 0xbffff330: 0xbffff340: 0xbffff350: 0xbffff360: 0xbffff370:	s(buffer);	GetInput.c:12 0x0000000a 0xb7e55196 0x00000000 0x00000000 0xbffff404	0x08049ff4 0xb7fc6ff4 <mark>0xbffff368</mark> 0x00000000 0xbffff40c	0x080484b1 0xb7e55225 0x0804847b 0xb7e3b4d3 0xb7fdc858	Return address to main THIS IS WHAT WE WANT TO CHANGE!

Demo



(qdb) disas CanNeverExecute Dump of assembler code for function CanNeverExecute: 0x08048434 <+0>: push %ebp 0x08048435 <+1>: mov %esp,%ebp \$0x18,%esp 0x08048437 <+3>: sub \$0x8048560,(%esp) 0x0804843a <+6>: movl 0x08048441 <+13>: call 0x8048340 <puts@plt> 0x08048446 <+18>: movl \$0x0,(%esp) 0x0804844d <+25>: call 0x8048360 <exit@plt> End of assembler dump.

We want to change the return address to this!

Remember its little endian.

What gets printed out?????



 Why doesn't the address of the function CanNeverExecute() change every time we run the program(even if ASLR is turned on)?

Prevention



Check operating system security features

- Ubuntu -<u>https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Security/Features</u>
- Windows XP SP2 and later <u>http://msdn.</u> <u>microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb430720.aspx</u>

Prevention



Compiling(linux binary with gcc)

- -Wall -Wextra -Wconversion --Wformat-security
- Turn on all warnings to help ensure the underlying code is secure.
- -Werror
- Turns all warnings into errors so you can't ignore them.
- -arch x86_64
- Compile for 64-bit to take max advantage of address space (important for ASLR).
- -fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector --param ssp-buffer-size=4
- Makes sure stack protection is turned on. The warning flag here tells you of any functions that aren't going to get protected.
- -pie -fPIE
- For ASLR
- -ftrapv
- Generates traps for signed overflow
- --D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2
- Buffer checks
- --WI,-z,relro,-z,now
- Mark various ELF memory sections read-only (GOT protection)

Prevention




Code

- Do not use deprecated functions like gets()!!!
- Make sure you use limits when reading into buffers
- Read the OWASP Developer GUIDE!
- Or at least as a reference :)



Data Execution Prevention(DEP)


- Marks some areas of memory (e.g. stack and heap) as non executable.
- Stops some buffer overflow exploits
- Cannot inject code onto the stack or heap and have it execute.





Stack Protection

- Detecting buffer overflows on stack-allocated variables
- On by default but people still turn it off if they can't get something to work
- Cannot protect against buffer overflows in the heap





GetInput() function in assembly

Stack protection enabled

<+0>:	push	%гbр
<+1>:	mov	%rsp,%rbp
<+4>:	sub	\$0x10,%rsp
<+8>:	mov	%fs:0x28,%rax
<+17>:	mov	%rax,-0x8(%rbp)
<+21>:	хог	%eax,%eax
<+23>:	lea	-0x10(%rbp),%rax
<+27>:	mov	%rax,%rdi
<+30>:	callq	0x4004f0 <gets@plt></gets@plt>
<+35>:	lea	-0x10(%rbp),%rax
<+39>:	mov	%rax,%rdi
<+42>:	callq	0x4004c0 <puts@plt></puts@plt>
<+47>:	mov	-0x8(%rbp),%rdx
<+51>:	хог	%fs:0x28,%rdx
<+60>:	je	0x40064f <getinput+67></getinput+67>
<+62>:	callq	0x4004d0 <stack_chk_fail@plt></stack_chk_fail@plt>
<+67>:	leaveq	
<+68>:	retq	

Stack protection disabled

<+0>:	push	%гbр
<+1>:	mov	%rsp,%rbp
<+4>:	sub	\$0x10,%rsp
<+8>:	lea	-0x10(%rbp),%rax
<+12>:	mov	%rax,%rdi
<+15>:	callq	0x400480 <gets@plt></gets@plt>
<+20>:	lea	-0x10(%rbp),%rax
<+24>:	mov	%rax,%rdi
<+27>:	callq	0x400460 <puts@plt></puts@plt>
<+32>:	leaveq	
<+33>:	retq	



ASLR(Address Space Layout Randomization)

- Makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict target addresses reliability
- How?
- By randomising the positions of key areas of memory like the stack, heap and libraries.

```
Turning Off ASLR
In Ubuntu
sudo echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
```

In Windows 7 ()

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\MoveImages



- Yes, these can be defeated!
- But it makes things much harder.
- How?
- With techniques like:
- Stack protection Structured Exception Handling (SEH)
- DEP Return-Oriented Programming
- ASLR NOP spray, Partial EIP/Direct RET overwrite, Bruteforce

What To Learn More?



- <u>http://bit.ly/ostbufferoverflow</u> open security training software exploits
- <u>http://www.securitytube.net/</u> Heaps of short how to videos
- Grey Hat Python Justin Seitz
- <u>http://www.corelan.be</u>

COME TO THE NEXT OWASP MEETUP!

- The November Meetup will have a handful of students giving lightning talks on their projects.
- Meetings will be announced on Melbourne Security Hub and through the OWASP mailing list.

Online Challenge



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Netcat (linux) - computer networking service for reading from and writing to network connections

- nc 54.254.172.116 9034
- Code: http://bit.ly/OWASPChallenge
- Given the following IP address and a link to the code. Try to exploit the server and get the "secret key". Then send it to me as the subject. First person to email me with the correct key wins!
- Social engineering (recon) you will have to find my email address on the web :) Google my name???

References



OWASP https://www.owasp.org

Swinburne Cyber Security Club http://bit.ly/swinburnecybersecurityclub

Examining a Buffer Overflow in C and assembly with gdb http://bit.ly/BOinC

Open Security Training(buffer overflow) http://bit.ly/ostbufferoverflow

Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit http://insecure.org/stf/smashstack.html